Wednesday, August 18, 2010

Another view

Not all sources - even Jewish or Israeli - are complimentary towards Arik and his commando unit. One of his harsher critics paints a more calculating and even cruel portrait:

"With (Sharon's) sharp political instincts, he soon discovered the secret that relatively junior field officers possess more actual power than higher-ranking officers who are far from the battlefield, not to mention civilian politicians who had little knowledge of military affairs yet adored the 'new Jewish warriors.' A field officer can inflame any border and blow any minor incident out of proportion. All such activities were nominally approved by the command as limited reactions to what Israel perceived as violations of the ceasefire agreements by the Arab states. However, in executing these actions, Sharon went far beyond he scope of what was ordered, planned, and accepted by his superiors. He explained these departures as the result of unexpected resistance by the enemy, unanticipated difficulties and obstacles on the battlefield, and the need to save the lives of Israeli soldiers or to avoid leaving behind the wounded and killed. The fact of the matter was that Sharon's expansive actions caused greater casualties - not only among the Arabs, but among Israeli soldiers as well. His practice of using provocations as a strategy - inciting Arabs and Jews to fight one another - became a major pattern of Sharon's conduct, one that he elaborated on and perfected as his career progressed."

Source: Kimmerling, Baruch. Politicide: Ariel Sharon's War Against the Palestinians. Verso, London. 2003.

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