Kimmerling, cont'd - response to question #4

Was Unit 101 habitually excessive in its approach to operations?

There are arguments on either side of the fence to handle this question. Looking at it rather coolly with statistics provided by Drory, we can compare the number of Israelis killed to the number of infiltrators killed in the various incidents that took place in border actions during this period. They are:

1953, 54, 55, 56:

Israelis killed - 51, 18, 20, 39; Infiltrators killed - 125, 52, 24, 58.
Israelis wounded - 45, 47, 43, 67; Infiltrators captured/surrendered* - 239, 152, 27, 75.

* Infiltrator wounded figures unavailable.

Looking only at these statistics, the claim doesn't appear groundless. But there are subjective concerns as well. For example, the infiltrators were in some cases army-trained soldiers attacking civilians, as in the case of Susan Kanias and her two children being killed by a grenade tossed in their house in Yahud. If two men perpetrated this act, and they were subsequently killed in a retaliatory raid, is it simply two Palestinian casualties and three Israeli casualties? Is that the math most clear-thinking people would use? Probably not.

But back to the simple numbers. Drory lists additional Israeli casualties in the reprisal actions in another table: they add up to 164 for the four years in question. If this is taken as the hard number - 164 - and this is compared to the infiltrator casualty number of 259, then there is at least a grain of truth in Ben-Gurion's growling assessment of the Alei Zait raid: "Too successful!"

Source: Drory, Sharon.